![]() Over time, that planning and gaming produced a mental model of how such a war would be fought, and what the Navy’s role would be. The remainder of the war, Phase III, would be “a progressively tightening blockade that would sever Japanese oceanic trade.” The end state of the plan was always a blockade that would choke off Japan’s imports and economy.Phase II would involve offensive operations to achieve sea control in the region, and would culminate in battle where “the two battle fleets would meet in a cataclysmic gunnery engagement.”.In Phase I, the Navy would rush out to the Western Pacific to seize and defend island bases.The outline of War Plan Orange envisioned three phases: The need for advanced bases to support the Fleet gave play to the development of amphibious capabilities. American planners recognized that setting the stage for such a clash required a major fleet with a capable naval aviation component, as well as the ability to logistically support a long campaign. Navy’s infatuation with Mahan – specifically, his idea of victory by titanic clashes of battleships. Much of this planning was driven by the U.S. Significant adaptation was needed.ĭuring the interwar era, the one constant in the Navy’s constantly evolving strategic planning was its focus on countering the empire of Japan – the so-called War Plan Orange. But events would show the plan was not well suited to the character of the conflict that emerged in late 1941. The entry into World War II presented a chance to demonstrate that those preparations were strategically sound and operationally feasible. Navy had been studying and gaming a war plan for a contest of arms in the Pacific. A look back at how the strategy was employed against Japan in WWII offers a number of insights for those debating ASB today.įor 40 years before the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. But it has garnered wide support inside and outside government., and sparked lively intellectual debate about the plausibility and utility of imposing a blockade on China as well as a related debate on AirSea Battle (ASB).īut blockades and economic warfare in the Pacific are nothing new. Offshore Control is not not without its critics, who question in particular its reliance on at sea interdiction and blockading China’s critical petroleum imports. ![]() This alternative brings our sights up to the strategic level. Hammes has developed and espoused an alternative construct called Offshore Control. There has been an extensive debate over the past year about the Pentagon’s concept for offsetting emerging Anti-Access/Area Denial challenges, the so-called Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept. Hammes and by Commander Jason Glab (“ Blockading China: A Guide”) that I will address in my next WOTR article. In fact, however, another World War II campaign may trump the importance of Midway, critical as it was: the effort to choke the Japanese economy through submarine warfare ) This inquiry is particularly relevant to ongoing strategic debates about military strategy in the Pacific put forth by my colleague at National Defense University, Dr. had been forced onto the defensive by Pearl Harbor and by pre-war planning delusions. As he pointed out, our intrepid pilots and the carrier fleet, supported by great intelligence work, turned the tide in the Pacific. Tom Hone recently wrote a marvelous depiction of the Battle of Midway right here on WOTR. ![]()
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